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Abstract. Combinatorial auctions have been suggested as a mean to raise effi-
ciency in multi-item negotiations with complementarities among goods as they 
can be found in procurement, energy markets, transportation, and the sale of 
spectrum auctions. Since 2008 the Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA), a two-
stage auction format has been used in many countries. [8] tested CCA in the lab 
and found out that the efficiency of CCA was relatively low, since bidders 
tended to submit too few bids. To reduce bidders’ complexity concerning eval-
uating lots of bundles, we simplified the bidding language without losing effi-
ciency. Hereby, we used the knowledge of super-additivity and the fixed de-
scending complementarity type of our value model. In lab experiments, we test-
ed the two phases of the CCA auction, namely the Combinatorial Clock + 
(CC+) auction and a sealed bid version, with the simplification separately. Both 
formats yielded in higher efficiency and revenue than the CCA. 
Keywords: Electronic markets and auctions, laboratory experiment, combinato-
rial auction 
1 Introduction 
Since 1994 more than 70 spectrum auctions were run using the simultaneous 
multiround auction (SMRA), an auction format which is based on [18]. In the SMRA 
auction several items are sold in a single auction. Bids on combinations of items are 
not allowed, whereas synergies in bidders’ valuations cannot be expressed. 
Therefore, there are many strategic problems for bidders (see also [12]), like the 
exposure risk. Hence and because of several other reasons, combinatorial auctions 
(CA) were used for spectrum auctions. 
Generally, CAs are IT-based economic mechanisms, where bidders can define their 
own combinations of items called “packages” or “bundles” and submit bids for them. 
Bids on individual items are not allowed to place. So, bidders can express better their 
valuation, which increases economic efficiency, especially in the presence of super-
additivities respectively economies of scope. Often CAs are iterative auctions, in 
which an auctioneer computes allocations and asks prices in each round. This would 
not be possible without IT-based auction platforms which solve hard computational 
problems in each auction round and calculate new ask prices. This is also a reason 
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why CAs have been a topic in much recent Information Systems (IS) research. Exam-
ples can be found within [16], [6], and [23]. The IS literature proposed also a lot for 
bidder decision support, designs for new application domains, and the analysis of 
bidder behavior in CAs (see also [1], [3-4]) An overview about current research in IS 
can be found within [7]. 
The design of CA, however, led to a number of fundamental design problems, and 
many contributions during the past few years [10-11]. 
An important CA, the Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) based on [17], is a 
two-stage auction format with consists of primary bid rounds for price discovery and 
a sealed bid round The CCA was used the U.K., the Netherlands, Denmark, and Aus-
tria for the recent sale of the 2.6 GHz band. 
The frequencies of the 2.6 GHz band are available for mobile services in all re-
gions of Europe. The 2.6 GHz spectrum band includes 190 MHz which are divided 
into blocks of 5 MHz. It can be used to deliver wireless broadband services or mobile 
TV. In particular, there are two standards which will likely be used in the 2.6 GHz 
band, LTE and WiMAX. LTE uses paired spectrum (units of 2 blocks), while 
WiMAX uses unpaired spectrum (units of 1 block). 
[8] compared CCA and the SMRA auction in the lab using two different value 
models. These models were designed similar to the practice. 
In each value model, 4 bidders participated and 24 lots were sold. The small model 
consisted of two bands with 14 respectively 10 blocks, the large one of 4 blocks with 
six bands each. In total, in the small value model, the complexity for bidders was 
quite lower, because they needed only to calculate ca. 50 possible bundles. Contrarily, 
in the large value model around 2,400 value models needed to be evaluated. Because 
of this high complexity, the efficiency of CCA in the lab was considerably lower than 
that of SMRA. 
In our paper, we tested the two phases of the CCA, namely the Combinatorial 
Clock + (CC+) auction and a sealed bid version, for the large value model separately. 
We addressed the recent criticism of [12], that bidder could not submit enough bids 
in a value model consisting of 2,400 possible bundles by reducing bidders’ complexi-
ty. We simplified the bidding language using the knowledge of super-additivity of our 
value model and the fixed descending complementarity type. As a consequence, the 
experiments that we conducted did not suffer from “too few bids” because the bidders 
had also a bidding tool to evaluate all the possible bundles quickly. This made it easy 
for them to submit their bids on all the relevant packages. We show that higher effi-
ciency is achieved by our modifications. 
This paper is organized as follows. The value model, the simplified bidding lan-
guage, the payment rule and the four competing auctions are introduced in Section 2. 
In Section 3, the experimental design is described and the results are presented in 
Section 4. Finally, Section 5 concludes with a discussion. 
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2 Auction Design and Theory 
We use in our experiments three different CA formats, CCA, CC+ and a sealed bid 
version. As a matter of completeness we also present the result of the SMRA, because 
we compare our result to those of [8], who tested SMRA and CCA. 
In SMRA, all items were sold at the same time whereas each item had its own 
price. Bidders could not bid on bundles. If there was overdemand for an item, i.e. the 
demand is larger than the supply, the auctioneer increased the price for this item by a 
fixed increment. The auction terminated if there was no bid within one round. SMRA 
is a generalization of the English auction for several items, where bidders have to pay 
what they bid. 
The CCA auction consisted of two phases, the clock phase and the sealed bid part. 
All items within one band had the same price, so there were 4 different (band-) prices 
in our value model for all blocks. The auctioneer announced the new ask price for 
each band in each round of the clock phase. Afterwards, bidders decided to bid on 
which amount of items in each band. The primary bids phase ended after there was no 
overdemand in any bands any more. 
The sealed bid phase consisted of only one round with as many sealed bids as de-
sired by the bidders. They were able to bid on any combination of items regardless of 
the bids of the first phase. A detailed description of SMRA and CCA can be found 
within [8]. 
In the following, we describe the implementation of the different formats that we 
actually tested in our experiments. But first, we explain the value model, the simpli-
fied bidding language and the payment rule we applied. 
2.1 The Value Model 
For our value model we used an economic setting which was inspired by spectrum 
sales as introduced at the beginning of this paper. [8] found out in lab experiments 
that the CCA performed poorly in this value model, since bidders had to evaluate 
2,400 different possible bundles. 
The model had 24 items with four bands, whereas each consisted of six items. 
Band A was of high value to all bidders and bands B, C, and D were less valuable. 
Every bidder received a base valuation for an item in each band. Base valuations are 
uniformly distributed: vA was in the range of [100; 300], while vB, vC and vD were in 
the range of [50; 200]. Furthermore, bidders had complementary valuations for bun-
dles of items. Within a band, each block has the same value for bidders. For example 
A01 has the same value as A02. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The value model 
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In all bands, bundles of two items resulted in a bonus of 60% on top of the base valua-
tions, bundles of three items in a bonus of 50%. More items did not add any extra 
bonus for this band. 
The structure of the value model and the distribution of the item valuations of all 
bands were known by all bidders. Bidders used an artificial currency called Franc. 
Although the value models resemble the characteristics of spectrum sales in Europe, 
this was not known to the subjects in the lab (neutral framing). In figure 2 you find an 
example concerning the value model with the draw 200 for block A and 100 for the 
blocks B, C, D. The valuation per unit is the highest at 2 goods. Then, it is decreasing. 
However, bids could only be placed for the whole amount and not per unit. 
 
 
Fig. 2. The valuation structure 
2.2 Simplified Bidding Language 
The literature often assumes that the auctioneer has no information on synergies in the 
bidder valuations. This is often not the case. In spectrum auctions, bidders and auc-
tioneers know about the main synergies in the valuations. For example, 2 blocks in 
800 have high synergies and 4 blocks in 2.6 as well. Using this knowledge, we con-
strained the language knowing that the valuation between bands are purely additive, 
because there are no cross synergies respectively super-additivities between bands. 
However, we have to remark, that in other situation, when the value model offers e.g. 
cross synergies or has other properties, the bidding language should be adapted in 
another way. 
Bidders could enter bids for 2, 4, 6 blocks (i.e., their maximum willingness to pay 
for a desired number of A, B, C and D) for each band, whereas each area has its own 
price per good which is equal for all goods. That means, altogether 12 bids can be 
submitted in the sealed bid auction respectively in the CC+ auction. This is a large 
simplification in comparison to the 2,400 bundles bidders had to evaluate in the CCA. 
We use an OR (additive-OR) bidding language between the bands and XOR (exclu-
sive-OR) within a band. OR-Bid means that each bidder is willing to win any number 
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of these disjoint bids, whereas XOR only allows winning at most one of the submitted 
bids. Thus, a bidder can win a maximum of 4 bids (one bid per band). 
Besides, the outcome closure property is fulfilled, because simplification is not 
constraining. We used the ideas of [19] to restrict the space of messages available to 
the players. Such a simplification has the advantage that it can eliminate undesirable 
equilibria. However, tight simplifications, like our modification to the bidding lan-
guage have to be used. Tightness removes certain equilibria that were created by 
eliminating profitable deviations. Some notes on this topic area given by [20]. 
We show, that designing the right bid language can lead to significant efficiency 
gains over simple SMRA or a full XOR CA, since for CAs to perform well, it is im-
portant for bidders to submit all relevant bids. 
In all the auction formats, we focus on designs with linear ask prices, where each 
item in the auction is assigned an individual ask price, and the price of a package of 
items is simply the sum of the single-item prices. Such prices are easy to understand 
for bidders in comparison to other pricing rules like the non-linear ask prices. 
2.3 The Payment Rule 
The bidder-optimal core-selecting payments used within CC+ and the sealed bid auc-
tion were calculated using a quadratic program. [14] suggested a procedure to calcu-
late bidder-Pareto-optimal payments from sealed bids right away. Over all total-
payment minimizing core points, that one are selected that minimize the sum of 
square deviations from the VCG payments (minimal Euclidean distance). The objec-
tive is to minimize the incentive to misreport one‘s valuations. 
Therefore, the core for package allocation problems has a competitive auction in-
terpretation: an individually rational allocation is in the core if there is no group of 
bidders who could all do better for themselves and for the seller by raising some of 
their losing bids. 
2.4 The CC+ Auction 
[9] described the single-phase CC+, which resembles the first phase in CCA. We 
tested it in the lab using the simplified bidding language for our value model. With 
this change we supposed to achieve more robust outcomes in terms of efficiency and 
revenue than the two-phase CCA. CC+ can be interpreted as a practical implementa-
tion of the fictitious “Walrasian auctioneer”. 
The auction consists of any number of rounds. Bidders enter (bundle) bids for 2, 4, 
6 blocks in each round, whereas all bids remain active throughout the auction. OR 
bids allow the auctioneer to allocate one bundle to every bidder in each of the 4 dif-
ferent bands. In contrast, by XOR, maximum one bundle within a band can be as-
signed to bidders. 
At the beginning of each round, the new prices of goods are announced. Based on 
these new prices each bidder will report the quantity how much A, B, C and D bun-
dles they want to buy. If there is excess demand (i.e. if the combined demand of all 
bidders within one band exceeded the number of blocks) in at least one band, a new 
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round starts with higher prices for the bands with excess demand. Start prices in the 
first round were set to 100 Franc for items in the A band and 50 Franc in the B, C, and 
D band. The price update is done by clock ticks for each block within a band. One 
clock tick in the A range is equivalent to 20 francs, in the B -, C and D range at 15 
francs. Besides an activity rule is installed. According to that a bidder must submit at 
least one bid in each current round, to may bid again for each possible bundle in the 
next round. If no block is overdemanded, the auctioneer solves the winner determina-
tion problem considering all bids submitted during the auction runtime. If the com-
puted allocation does not displace any active last iteration bidder, the auction termi-
nates. The auctioneer selects these bids that maximize the total revenue of the auction. 
[9] have shown that it is an ex-post equilibrium strategy for the bidders to submit 
their power set bids, which means to submit bids on all packages with a positive valu-
ation in each round. 
2.5 The Sealed Bid Auction 
In the sealed bid auction, bidders enter bids for 2, 4, 6 blocks in the single round, 
whereas a maximum of 12 bids is possible in the whole auction. The auctioneer col-
lects the bids and determines the revenue maximizing allocation and the prices. The 
same bidding language is used as within CC+, namely XOR within a band and OR 
between bands. During the auction, bidders do not get information about activities 
(bids) of other bidders. 
3 Experimental Design 
Our experiments are based on the MarketDesigner software framework, which we 
extended by an implementation of the simplified bidding language and of the two 
tested auction formats. 
We consider 2 treatment factors, auction format and bidding language. The value 
model was for all formats, SMRA, CCA, CC+ and the sealed bid auction the same. 
For treatments 1 and 2, where the bidding language was fully expressive we used the 
results of [8]. For the treatments 3 and 4, which we actually tested in the lab, the sim-
plified bidding language was used. Overall, we get four different treatments: 
Table 1. Treatment structure 
Treatment no. Auction format Bidding language Auctions 
1 SMRA Fully expressive 16 
2 CCA Fully expressive 16 
3 CC+ Simplified 16 
4 Sealed bid Simplified 16 
 
Our experiments were conducted from June to July 2012 with students in computer 
science, mathematics, physics, and mechanical engineering at the TU München. The 
Our Experiments 
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subjects were recruited via e-mail lists and conducted experiments in a computer lab 
at the TU München. Each subject participated in a single auction format in one ses-
sion, but never in different ones. One session comprised all four auctions of one auc-
tion format of one wave. For the value model we drew valuations for four waves (A-
D) randomly. All auctions of waves A, B, C and D were tested with the four auction 
formats. CC+ took on average four hours and the sealed bid auction between two and 
a half hours. 
Subjects did not have to prepare for the experiment. All required information was 
given to the participants. Before each session, the environment, the auction rules and 
all the relevant information were explained to the participants. All the instructions 
were read aloud and participants had to participate in a test about the economic envi-
ronment and the auction rules. 
An additional tool to analyze bundle valuations and payoffs was introduced to all 
subjects. This tool showed a simple list of all available bundles which could be sorted 
by bundle size, bidder individual valuation or the payoff based on current prices. As a 
matter of course, last mentioned option was not available for the sealed bid format. 
At the beginning of each auction all subjects received the individual draw of valua-
tions, the distribution of valuations, and the information about the complementarity of 
items. With this information, subjects were asked to reason about the implications of 
the draw on their bidding in the upcoming auction. Each round was scheduled with 3 
minutes. The time given to the subjects in each sealed bid auction was 20 minutes. 
The subjects could ask for more time if required. 
After each session subjects were compensated financially. The total compensation 
resulted from a 10 Euro show up fee and the auction reward. The auction reward was 
calculated by a 3 Euro participation reward plus the payoff of all auction payoffs con-
verted from Franc into Euro by a 12:1 ratio. Negative payoffs were deducted from the 
participation reward. Negative payoffs higher than the participation reward were ig-
nored. Due to the different duration and auction formats, payoffs were different. 
Therefore, we leveled the expected payoff per participant. In CC+, we compensated 
two out of four and in sealed bid one out of four auctions. On average, each subject 
received in CC+ 70.94 EUR and in the sealed bid auction 37.69 EUR. 
4 Results 
First, we present efficiency and revenue of the different auction formats on an aggre-
gate level. 
4.1 Efficiency and Revenue Share 
We use allocative efficiency (or simply efficiency) as a primary measure. 
Given an allocation X and price set Ppay, let Ɏi(X, Ppay) denote the payoff of the 
bidder i for the allocation X and Ɏall(X, Ppay) ؔ ? iג Ɏi(X, Ppay) denote the total payoff 
of all bidders for an allocation at the prices Ppay. Further, let Ɏሺǡ pay) denote the 
auctioneer revenue. We measure efficiency as the ratio of the total valuation of the 
resulting allocation X to the total valuation of an efficient allocation X*. 
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  (1) 
Because of the simplification of the bidding language 100% efficiency cannot always 
be achieved. To consider this fact, also the relative efficiency  is computed. 
Therefore, we define  as the best allocation that can be achieved with the simpli-
fied bidding language. 
 is calculated as 
  (2) 
We also report the revenue distribution, which shows how the overall economic value 
is distributed between the auctioneer and bidders. The auctioneer revenue is measured 
as the ratio of the auctioneer's revenue to the total sum of valuations of an efficient 
allocation X*: 
  (3) 
Additionally, the average number of unsold items is evaluated. 
Table 2. Aggregate measures of auction performance 
Auction format E(X) 
 
R(X) Unsold items 
CC+ 97,26% 97,60% 78,96% 0 
Sealed bid 97,21% 97,55% 77,28% 0 
SMRA 98.51% 98,85% 81,96% 0 
CCA 89.33% 89,64% 37,41% 1.25 (5.2%) 
 
 
Fig. 3. Efficiency and relative efficiency 
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Fig. 4. Auctioneer’s revenue share 
Table 3. Significance tests (Wilcoxon rank sum tests) for a difference on all pairs of auction 
formats 
Comparison E(X) 
 
R (X) 
CC+ vs. CCA W=219 (p=0.000) W=218 (p=0.000) W=255 (p=0.000) 
CC+ vs. Sealed bid W=123 (p=0.867) W=120 (p=0.777) W=146.5 (p=0.498) 
CC+ vs. SMRA W=74 (p=0.044) W=84.5 (p=0.105) W=88 (p=0.138) 
Sealed bid vs. CCA W=255 (p=0.000) W=218 (p=0.000) W=219 (p=0.000) 
Sealed bid vs. SMRA W=74 (p=0.044) W=84.5 (p=0.105) W=88 (p=0.138) 
CCA vs. SMRA W=30 (p=0.000) W=9 (p=0.000) W=0 (p=0.000) 
 
Support for the first three results is presented in figure 3, table 2 and 3. 
 
Result 1: The efficiency of SMRA, CC+ and the sealed bid format was not significant-
ly different. 
In all the three auction formats we achieved high efficiency, on average higher than 
97%. All items were sold and we did not lose social welfare by not assigning some 
items. 
 
Result 2: The efficiency of the CCA was significantly lower than that of the other 
auction formats. 
Bidders’ choice set in the value model consisted of 2,400 different bundles, be-
cause bidders had to combine the number of items across all bands in each bundle bid. 
It is very difficult for human bidders to find the most valuable packages in this scale. 
 
Result 3: By using the simplified bidding language we do not loose efficiency. 
By restricting our bidding language we do not loose efficiency in comparison to 
the fully expressivity. We see, that E(X)  and  are only different by ca. 0.3%. 
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One reason is the complementarity of the value model. Besides, the most efficient 
allocations consist of combinations of two, four and rarely six sized bundles. As a 
consequence, we simplify the language from 2,400 possible bids to at most 12 bids 
significantly without losing efficiency. 
 
Result 4: The auctioneer revenue of SMRA, CC+ and the sealed bid auction was 
significantly higher than that of the CCA. 
Support for result 4 and 5 can be found in figure 4 and table 2 and 3. A reason for 
this is that only within CCA items remained unsold. So, the auctioneer did not earn 
money for each block and missed revenue. 
 
Result 5: The auctioneer’s revenue of SMRA, CC+ and the sealed bid auction was 
not significantly different.  
This result is remarkable, because in SMRA a different payment rule was applied 
as within CC+ and the sealed bid auction. Nevertheless, the revenue is in the same 
range. 
 
Now, we describe bidder behavior in CC+ and the sealed bid auction at first. 
4.2 Bidding Behavior in the Sealed Bid Auction 
To analyze bidding behavior, we looked at bid shading. Shading is computed by the 
difference of bidders’ valuation and the bid price for a certain bundle. Percental shad-
ing is shading divided by the valuation. In the following we categorize the bidders 
according to their strength. 
Bidders with the highest valuation within a band are called very strong bidders, 
with the second highest valuation medium strong, with the third highest valuation 
medium weak and finally, bidders that drew the lowest valuation are named very 
weak. 
Table 4. Average bid shading 
Bidders’ type Absolute shading Percental shading 
Very strong 68,75 5,40% 
Medium strong 26,09 2,40% 
Medium weak 31,66 2,86% 
Very weak 2,77 0,47% 
 
Result 6: In the sealed bid auction both the absolute and the percental bid shading of 
the very strong bidders is significantly higher than that of the others bidders. 
The higher the valuation was the bidder has drawn within a block; the more he 
shaded the bid. Bidders did not want to lose when they evaluated their situation as 
strong. Therefore, they placed bids above their valuation to assure their win. 
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Table 5. Wilcoxon tests for bid shading 
 Very strong Medium strong Medium weak Very weak 
Very strong - W=29462 
(p=0.046) 
W=28483 
(p=0.114) 
W=30348 
(p=0.001) 
Medium 
strong 
- - W=22113 
(p=0.709) 
W=23740 
(p=0.223) 
Medium 
weak 
- - - W=23778 
(p=0.1303) 
Very weak - - - - 
 
Result 7: In the sealed bid auction both the absolute and the percental bid shading of 
the medium strong and medium weak is not significantly different. 
The valuations, the medium strong and medium weak bidders drew, were some-
times not far apart. Bidders could not exactly determine their strength compared to 
their competitors in such situations. As a consequence, the behavior of these two 
kinds of bidders did not differ. 
 
Result 8: The weak bidder did not shade his bids. 
The weak bidder knew that he might be the one with the lowest valuation. Thus, he 
did not apply bid shading in order to avoid the risk to make a loss. 
 
Support for Result 6, 7 and 8 is given in table 4 and 5. In Figure 5 we made linear 
interpolations of bidders’ shading to get an overview of their actual activities. If a bid 
is not connected, bidders updated it during the auction and it was not yet active for 
winner determination. We see that the bid shading of different bidders is quite differ-
ent. 
The literature on explaining this is huge and beyond what we can describe in this 
context. Overall, risk aversion, regret, spite, and wrong expectations about the bids of 
others are the most common conjectures. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Shading in the sealed bid auction 
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4.3 Bidding Behavior in the CC+ Auction 
For the following analysis it is of interest if bidders applied their equilibrium bidding 
strategy for the CC+. Besides, a remark is given how bidders submitted their bids. 
 
Result 9: In the CC+ auction, bidders followed a powerset strategy. 
Bidders placed always their powerset bids in the CC+ auction at least in the first 
round. This means 48 bids, since 4 bidders participated in each auction who could 
submit bids on all the 12 possible bundles. 
On average, CC+ consisted of 18.75 rounds and 367.75 bids have been submitted 
in each auction until the weakest bidder had reached his valuation and dropped out of 
the auction. The number of winning bidders was on average 3.8 (in 13 out of 16 auc-
tions all four bidders won at least one bid). Support can also bid found in figure 6. 
 
Result 10: Bidders placed their bids on their best bundles. 
Bidders focused on their best bundle, because there was the highest valuation per 
unit. So, 39.51% of all bids have been for bids on 2 sized bundles, 32.27% for bids on 
4 sized and finally, 28.22% on 6 sized bundles. Support can be found on figure 7. To 
get an impression of the scale of the submitted bids we talk, in figure 7 and 8 the 
numbers and not percental figures are used. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Number of bids in each round 
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Fig. 7. Distribution of bids  Fig. 8. Bids according to bidders’ strength 
Result 11: The number of bids depends on bidders’ strength. 
In percentage, 34.17% of all bids submitted the very strong bidder, 28.82% the 
medium strong bidder, 22.36% the medium weak bidder and 14.65% the weakest 
bidder. If prices are too high, weak bidders cannot participate in the auction. Later in 
the auction, even prices for the medium weak or sometimes the medium strong bidder 
increased too much. 
5 Conclusion 
Combinatorial auctions have led to a substantial amount of research and found a 
number of applications in high-stakes auctions for industrial procurement, logistics, 
energy trading, and the sale of spectrum licenses. Thereby, communication complexi-
ty is a problem in all CAs. The question is important, how many bids must be submit-
ted to the auctioneer to calculate an efficient allocation. Hence, we simplified the 
bidding language using our knowledge of the value model. Bidders only had to sub-
mit 12 bids in each round respectively in the whole sealed bid auction in comparison 
to evaluate all possible 2,400 bundles in the CCA. Besides, we used for CC+ and the 
sealed bid auction an OR bidding language between bands, which leads to the fact 
that bidders need to submit much less bids as with a pure XOR bidding language in 
CCA. Efficiency is not significantly decreased by this modification. 
Single-phase auction formats where bidders can submit more than a single bid per 
round can have advantages and elicit more "relevant" bundle bids throughout the pro-
cess. So, we tested the two phases of the CCA, the CC+ and the sealed bid auction in 
lab experiments, separately. We found out, that theses single-phase CAs achieved 
more robust outcomes and realized significantly higher efficiency and revenue than 
the CCA. However, there are almost no differences concerning the efficiency and 
revenue between the sealed bid and CC+ auction. But, the SMRA remained the most 
efficient auction format in our experimental setting. Nevertheless, there are many 
disadvantages to SMRA like the exposure problem, which says that in case of com-
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plementarities, bidders run the risk of winning only a part of a complementary collec-
tion of items in an auction without package bids. Besides, in order to maintain eligible 
bidders temporarily bid for packages they are not interested in which can provide less 
efficient outcomes. Bidders can also use signaling such as jump bidding to cooperate 
in SMRA. These reasons are only exemplarily, why it is not proper to use it SMRA in 
practice. 
We argue that in addition to theoretical research, more empirical work is needed, in 
order to understand real-world bidder behavior. Additionally, the CCA could also be 
tested with the simplified bidding language and compared with the results obtained by 
our tested single phase auctions. 
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